The astounding wave of protest that followed the election led many, inside and outside Iran, to believe that a revolutionary movement was on the making, based on widespread discontent and sparked by clear signs of vote rigging.
An impressive amount of people took to the streets in Teheran and other cities, showing day after day their determination.
And this euphoria, combined and reinforced by a large external community of supporters, in fact led those involved to believe it was possible for this crowd, composed mainly by an educated urban middle-class, to bring down Ahmadinejad and, with him, the ideological walls containing iranian society.
But soon, there was an unmistakable sign that the euphoria wasn't based on a sound assessment of the correlation of forces between the distinct groups. An appeal to a general industrial labourers strike clearly failed, revealing a significant difference in class perceptions and aims, and therefore a united front couldn't be built. At the same time, the armed forces clearly opted to stay out the game. From then on the opposition was objectively isolated, and at that point it would have been wiser for it to move more carefuly and avoid a needless exposition of its most vocal and idealist young elements. A few warnings came out, but went unnoticed or were simply ignored.
The rest is well known... Increasingly, the movement had to rely on the dubious support of dissenting sectors of the establishment, which had neither the will, and probably neither the power, to engage in a deep change of the foundations of the islamic republic.
One could say that even without major economic troubles, the iranian regime is pregnant with its own killer. No doubt, development needs can't be fulfilled without the education of larger and larger segments of iranian youth. And with it, inevitably, as the resulting middle class grows, so will grow its claims and its strenght, increasingly destabilizing the regime. But this dynamic alone won't produce effects in less than 10 to 15 years.
But soon, there was an unmistakable sign that the euphoria wasn't based on a sound assessment of the correlation of forces between the distinct groups. An appeal to a general industrial labourers strike clearly failed, revealing a significant difference in class perceptions and aims, and therefore a united front couldn't be built. At the same time, the armed forces clearly opted to stay out the game. From then on the opposition was objectively isolated, and at that point it would have been wiser for it to move more carefuly and avoid a needless exposition of its most vocal and idealist young elements. A few warnings came out, but went unnoticed or were simply ignored.
The rest is well known... Increasingly, the movement had to rely on the dubious support of dissenting sectors of the establishment, which had neither the will, and probably neither the power, to engage in a deep change of the foundations of the islamic republic.
One could say that even without major economic troubles, the iranian regime is pregnant with its own killer. No doubt, development needs can't be fulfilled without the education of larger and larger segments of iranian youth. And with it, inevitably, as the resulting middle class grows, so will grow its claims and its strenght, increasingly destabilizing the regime. But this dynamic alone won't produce effects in less than 10 to 15 years.
Fortunately, many cracks developed at the establishment elites during the last year. And as the winning faction seems to rely more and more on a closed oligarchic model, with negative impact on the country governance, it becomes acceptable to expect a social crisis more sooner than later.
Let's hope that the iranian opposition concentrates on building the necessary bridges to form a large platform with a clear and realistic set of political objectives. Then it will succeed.
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário